I was surprised to read Michael Arrington’s TechCrunch post on Friday that Edgeio was going to be shut down. On the one hand, it’s kind of scary, my being in the vertical search space and all.

There’s always that moment of initial fear when you read something like that. Maybe nuroa really isn’t going to work? WTF have I gotten myself into? And HTF did they burn through $5 million in less than a year without being able to generate any revenue or relevant traffic or enter into any significant strategic alliances? This is perhaps the biggest question in most people’s minds. (It still amazes me that a start-up that launched in Feb. 2006 could receive a cheque for $ 5 million from a VC only 7 months later! I’m assuming the valuation at that point must have been somewhere between $15 and $20 million?)

But upon closer analysis, it’s clear that Edgeio’s problems had less to do with being a vertical search engine and more to do with being more of a concept than a business. To me, Edgeio’s failure reflects the danger of creating a tech-geek project with very little appeal or applicability in the real world.

Following are the four main lessons that I think can be learned from Edgeio’s demise.

Not All Vertical Search Engines Are Created Equal: Whereas the majority of vertical search engines crawl classifieds portals like Idealista and ImmobilienScout 24, or have a direct relationship with real estate agencies like Sasi or Engel & Völkers, Edgeio’s model was to operate — as the name suggests — on the “edge”. Cutting through the PR jargon, this means that they only looked for classifieds listings on blogs or other RSS-enabled sources — this explains Michael Arrington’s involvement and value-added to the project. TechCrunch was the ideal platform from which to launch a blog-focused vertical search engine. As TechCrunch explained when Edgeio launched: “The Edgeio ethos is that content belongs on the edges, and that is where the name originates from (Edge input/output). Content on the edges means the content on the millions of blogs and other sites out there which Edgeio does a good job of aggregating and organizing.” So whereas property search engines like nuroa aim to disrupt the traditional classifieds space by crawling mainstream classifieds sites, Edgeio chose instead to bet that sellers would be willing to create blogs on which they listed their properties or other classifieds, and Edgeio would then aggregate those blogged classified listings. The basic problem is that a business focused only on classifieds in blogs is not currently very scalable, as the majority of people still use more traditional offline and online options (e.g., classifieds portals and newspapers) to advertise classifieds goods.

Classifieds Are Local: Given that their main market is the blogosphere, Edgeio was never focused on any one geographical market. If you take a look at their website (which is very well-designed by the way), the tagline is “search the world’s listings”. Their value proposition was that they granted you access to over 100 million listings in 1,484,953 cities and 166 countries What does this mean in practice? If I’m looking for an apartment in Barcelona, why would I care that there are lots of listings in 1,484,952 other cities? Also, I don’t really see why local advertisers would choose to advertise on an “international” website, particularly if this international website isn’t one of the leaders in its local classifieds space. In other words, if I am Expofinques and I want to strengthen my market position in Madrid where I’m not as strong as I am in Barcelona, why would I advertise on Edgeio as opposed to the other sites that are more focused on Madrid? And if I’m a property buyer in Barcelona why would I be more interested in searching “the world’s listings” than in searching “the most complete set of listings in Barcelona”? Start-ups have to focus on a market, or a product, or on something in particular. Being focused on “the world’s listings” is largely meaningless, other than as a concept.

Keep Your Burn Rate Down Until You Have Some Indice of Possible Success: Edgeio’s hype always had more to do with the connection to Michael Arrington and TechCrunch than anything else. Whereas companies like Trulia, Simply Hired and Indeed have generated significant traffic, marquee-name investors (Sequioa, News Corp. and The New York Times) and are growing nicely (e.g., Trulia’s U.S. traffic is up 130 percent in 2007, to 1.2 million unique visitors per month, according to Comscore), Oodle’s vanguardist and diffuse approach never seemed to catch on. Nonetheless, it seems that they were determined to buy their success and hoped to convince investors to continue investing in them, even though they had no material revenues, traffic or partnerships. Michael Arrington is pretty direct in explaining why Edgeio had to close down: “The company burned through [$5 million] according to plan, meaning they ran out this month. The product roadmap was fulfilled, meaning development lags didn’t hurt the company. But the revenues didn’t come in and user/partner milestones weren’t met. And that meant no one else was going to put more money into the company.” In the comments section, he’s even more reflective and frank: “In general I’ll say this - it is unwise for a company to spend a lot of money building out infrastructure before a product proves itself.”

This is just further proof of what Fred Wilson of Union Square Ventures noted in a recent post entitled “Why Early Stage Venture Investments Fail“: “[I]t’s pretty clear to me that most venture backed investments don’t fail because the business plan was flawed. In my experience at least 2/3 of all business plans we back are flawed. Most venture backed investments fail because the venture capital is used to scale the business before the correct business plan is discovered. That scale/burn rate becomes the cancer that kills the business.”

It’s Easier to Criticize than to Do It Yourself: I can’t help but note a certain irony in noting that one of tech’s most noted and sometimes more hyper-critical bloggers — he created the Dead Pool with a certain glee — is the co-founder of the most prominent vertical search engine to enter the Dead Pool, despite all of the natural advantages that he has given his access to financing and marketing. Most of us would give our left arm to appear prominently in TechCrunch, but Edgeio is proof that expensive marketing can’t make up for an ill-conceived product.

And it also shows that like the old saying goes: “Opinions are like assholes. Everyone has one.” It’s a lot easier to criticize others than to create a successful product yourself.

The best we can do is hope to learn from Edgeio’s mistakes so as not to end up like they did.